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I. INTRODUCTION – A SLEEPING GIANT AWAKENS

It is perhaps the dominant truism of the twenty-first century that has
awakened China from her slumber to claim the status of a global
superpower. In recent years, China has eclipsed Japan as the third
largest economy, after the United States and the European Union. China
is a giant in global trade, with import and exports of goods equal to U.S.
$3.87 trillion in 2012.1 This means that in 2012, China surpassed the
United States (U.S. $3.82 trillion) as the biggest trading nation in the
world in terms of trade volume in goods. As of 2011, the number of
China’s middle class exceeded the entire population of the United
States.2 By 2026, the number of Chinese middle-class citizens will
reach an estimated 800 million.3 Additionally, according to a 2012
report, there are now 1,020,000 millionaires in China, defined as those
with total assets equal to at least U.S. $1.6 million, and 63,500
individuals with total assets equal to at least U.S. $16 million.4 The
Hurun Rich List has been tracking China’s tycoons since 1999, and
reported that the number of U.S. dollar billionaires in China totaled 271
in 2010, an increase from 130 in 2009.5 The resulting cultural,
economic, and political turmoil from these and other rapid changes in
China has been the subject of thousands of popular and scholarly articles
1. China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 10, 2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-become-the-world-s-biggesttrading-nation.html.
2. Helen H. Wang, The Biggest Story of Our Time: The Rise of China’s Middle Class,
FORBES, Dec. 21, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/helenwang/2011/12/21/the-biggest-story-ofour-time-the-rise-of-chinas-middle-class/.
3. Id.
4. GroupM Knowledge, Hurun Report Together with GroupM Knowledge, HURUN WEALTH
REPORT 2012, July 31, 2012, http://www.hurun.net/usen/NewsShow.aspx?nid=283.
5. Malcolm Moore, China’s Billionaires Double in Number, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7,
2011, 10:52 AM BST, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8746445/Chinasbillionaires-double-in-number.html.
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and books. Surprisingly, throughout the tumult, the Chinese political
system has remained relatively stable, although not without controversy.
In the legal academy, one under-studied characteristic of China’s
stability has been its foreign policy, especially as it plays out in the
international economic law arena. This article draws on political
science, international relations, and the legal literature on global
governance and coalition-building in order to begin to fill the void.
For the past ten years, China’s foreign policy has been guided by
the zealous and consistent pursuit of three “core interests.”6 These core
interests include: (1) ensuring the permanence of China’s fundamental
system (including the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party) and
the maintenance of internal security, (2) protecting state sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and (3) the continued economic development and
stable social order.7 This article highlights the major domestic and
foreign policy characteristics of each of these three core interests under
President Hu Jintao’s leadership from 2002 to 2012. Despite China’s
recent power transition and the ascendancy of Xi Jinping as head of state
in 2012 and President in March 2013, no one expects significant changes
in the broad contours of China’s foreign policy. Because the three core
interests will continue to guide Chinese foreign policy in the predictable
future, it is important to understand the global governance and trade
policy implications of their unabated salience.
This article takes an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on
political science, international relations, and legal global governance
literatures to explain how China’s foreign policy impacts and guides its
trade policy, which is manifested in the three core interests. The article
makes the case that the core interest analysis holds promising
explicative, predictive, persuasive, and coalition-building value in the
arenas of global trade policy and dispute settlement.
The insight that China pursues its interests in foreign affairs is, of
course, not new. All nations do.8 However, two factors make the
analysis advanced in this article useful and timely. There is a critical
6. See Wang Jisi, China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its
Way, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 71 (2011) (arguing that China’s pursues sovereignty, security and
development simultaneously).
7. 首轮中美经济对话:除上月球外主要问题均已谈, 中新社 [Talks Begin at the First
China-U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue], July 28, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/
news/2009/07-29/1794984.shtml (reporting on comments by State Councilor Dai Bingguo at the
first China-U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue in Washington, D.C., in July 2009).
8. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWERS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 7-16 (1989) (coining the term “neoliberal institutionalism”
and distinguishing this from other interest-based international relations theories).
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difference in the temporal scope of policy changes between China and
other countries, especially other superpowers. Take the United States
for example. One can point to a distinct foreign policy shift between the
administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
Commentators disagree on the exact degree of the change,9 but few
would allege that there was no policy change.10 In contrast, China’s
foreign policy has remained remarkably consistent for ten years – and
these were ten years characterized by rapid social change, intense
economic change, and seismic cultural shifts in other arenas of Chinese
life. Yet China’s foreign policy goals remained unchanged. Even more
strikingly, it is likely to remain fundamentally unchanged for at least
another decade. The only foreseeable change is that China will pursue
the three core interests even more actively.11
While political scientists and international relations scholars are
used to interest-based discourse, such discourse is often missing in the
legal literature. Moreover, the intersection between the three disciplines
(political science, international relations, and law) is under-theorized.
Thus, this article makes a much-needed contribution to the
interdisciplinary literature on China.
Understanding how China perceives and pursues its core interests is
critical and important in four distinct, but related, ways. First, China’s
past behavior is a predictor of future behavior. This is true both in
domestic policy and foreign policy (see Part II). Second, in the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) arena, applying the core interest analysis
helps us predict what cases China will file or prosecute as well as what
cases we can expect China to defend most zealously (see Part III.B’s
case study). Third, the core interests’ analysis yields insight on China’s
future role in coalition and alliance-building attempts, which are
especially important for smaller developing countries. Armed with this
information, these countries can better frame their coalition building or
negotiations strategies to appeal to China’s interests. In other words,
understanding the core interests and how they play out in WTO litigation
will help countries predict areas in which China will likely be an ally.
Where China’s core interests are not implicated, China is unlikely to
lend a helping hand. Lastly, this real-politik understanding exposes one
9. Brett McGurk, Agreeing on Afghanistan: Why the Obama Administration Chose
Consensus This Time, FOREIGN AFF., June 21, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67957/
brett-mcgurk/agreeing-on-afghanistan.
10. See generally Barack Obama, Essay: Renewing American Leadership, FOREIGN AFF.
(July/Aug. 2007).
11. See Jisi, supra note 6, at 71.
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of the remaining weaknesses of the WTO system, in which small
economies are still held hostage to power politics. This last observation
leads to significant implications for international global governance that
is elaborated in detail in Part V.
This article proceeds in five main parts. Part II traces the contours
of China’s three core interests in action, both in the domestic and
international spheres. While not purporting to be exhaustive, it takes
some of the most significant events in China’s recent history and
examines them through the core interest lens. This section provides a
deeper understanding of China’s motives by embedding them in the
context of geopolitical goals and policies. Part III focuses the lens more
narrowly on the arena of international trade law. It examines the
ongoing U.S.-China and E.U.-China trade disputes on solar subsidies in
terms of a core interest analysis. This section provides a useful roadmap
for understanding future cases. It demonstrates that China engages in a
deliberate and intentional weighing of how WTO litigation and other
activities advance or impede its strategic interests. Part IV examines the
policy and normative implications of these finding with an
interdisciplinary analysis drawing on political science, international
relations, and legal global governance literatures. Part V lays out the
four significant implications to be drawn from this article’s arguments,
briefly described in the paragraph above. Part VI concludes.
II. PURSUIT OF CORE INTERESTS
For the past ten years, three core interests have been the driving
engines of China’s foreign policy. These core interests are: (1) ensuring
the permanence of China’s governing system and the maintenance of
internal security, (2) protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and (3) the continued economic development and stable social order.
Each of these three core interests present significant global governance
implications in the area of both foreign and trade policy. This section
traces the origins and contours of each of the three core interests.
A. Overview of China’s Foreign Policy and Core Interests
Thanks to China’s tight one-party rule, its foreign policy tends to be
relatively consistent over time. During the presidency of Deng Xiaoping
(1992 to 1997), China was widely perceived as “passive”12 in the foreign
12. See Evan S. Medeiros & M. Taylor Fravel, China’s New Diplomacy, 82 FOREIGN AFF.
22, 23 (2003) (arguing that China’s passivity in foreign diplomacy began to change with Beijing’s
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policy sphere. The policy has been described as “rhetorically promoting
a ‘peaceful international environment’ in which to grow their economy
while free-riding on the tough diplomatic work of others.”13 As a rule, it
played a quiet role in international forums such as the United Nations
(“UN”), where despite its seat on the Security Council, it rarely claimed
the spotlight, preferring to operate in the shadows whenever its interests
were implicated.14 While other nations certainly also operate informally
in back rooms (at the UN or elsewhere), China stands out for the rarity
with which it has proclaimed any public positions.15 China has also
eschewed important leadership roles in important multinational
negotiations, such as the Kyoto Agreement on Climate Change.16 While
China insisted on treatment as a developing nation, it left the advocacy
for the implications of such a label to others like India and Brazil.17
During this time, China was not active at the International Court of
Justice – participating for the first time only in 2009 in an advisory
hearing on Kosovo.18 It did actively pursue membership in the WTO19
as well as negotiate a number of key bilateral trade agreements,20

facilitation of three party talks in 2003 over North Korea’s nuclear policies).
13. See Elizabeth C. Economy, The Game Changer: Coping with China’s Foreign Policy
Revolution, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 142, 142 (2010).
14. Jorge G. Castañeda, Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the
Helm Would Hurt Global Governance, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 109, 111 (2010) (arguing that Brazil,
China, India, and South Africa are not ready to join the helm. Their shaky commitment to
democracy, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and environmental protection would only
weaken the international system’s core values).
15. China and Qatar Block Security Council Statement on Darfur Crimes, SUDAN TRIBUNE,
Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article25104.
16. For example, the United States justified its refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on the
ground that the Protocol incorporated the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility,”
leaving China, India, and other developing countries without any significant responsibility for
emissions reductions. See Por Thilo Kunzemann, The Past and Future of the Kyoto Protocol,
ALLIANZ, Nov. 27, 2011, http://sustentabilidade.allianz.com.br/?131 (stating that U.S. politicians
were angered by the fact that the Kyoto Protocol gave major economic competitors a “free ride”).
Canada echoed these complaints when it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol at the Durban
conference. See Canada to Withdraw from Kyoto Protocol, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011, 7:01 AM),
http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16151310. The Chinese delegation at Durban
“accused developed countries of hypocrisy.” See, e.g., John M. Broder, Climate Talks in Durban
Yield Limited Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, at A9; see also Roger Harrabin, UN Climate
Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise Compensation, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:20 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018.
17. See Castañeda, supra note 14, at 118.
18. Dapo Akande, Is China Changing Its View of International Tribunals? EJIL: TALK! (Oct.
4, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-china-changing-its-view-of-international-tribunals/.
19. See DEEPAK BHATTASALI ET AL, EDS., CHINA AND THE WTO: ACCESSION, POLICY
REFORM, AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 1 (World Bank ed. 2004).
20. MOFCOM, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.
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although both were seen as critical to China’s economic development.
Overall, commentators have described China’s foreign policy under
Deng as maintaining the status quo.21
Deng oversaw the beginnings of China’s great economic expansion,
but it was under Hu Jintao’s leadership that China’s economy flowered.
Hu Jintao presided over China’s phenomenal rise as a global economic
power in just ten years. China’s economy has grown steadily since
2002, dipping only temporarily in the aftermath of the 2008 global
financial crisis.22 This sustained growth ushered in a marked increase in
China’s willingness to assert its newfound economic clout in foreign
affairs. One observes three distinct but related trends under Hu. First,
Hu abandoned Deng’s low-profile diplomacy in favor of more assertive,
even aggressive, stances. Second, Hu sought to elevate China’s global
leadership and geopolitical position via foreign policy. Third, China
showed increased readiness to undertake a stronger role in international
governance befitting its new status as a rising power. China’s leaders
now recognize that fulfilling their domestic needs of economic growth
demands a more activist global strategy.23
Each of these trends developed in tandem with China’s pursuit of
three core interests. Not only was the Chinese leadership increasingly
assertive in defense of the core national interests, but so were the
Chinese people. Both reacted, on occasion, quite stridently to perceived
slights to its national pride and sovereignty. A nationalist rhetoric
emerged, and took strong root. A recent example occurred in 2012 when
the Chinese government tacitly sanctioned anti-Japanese populist
protests over Japan’s alleged purchase and nationalization of the hotly
contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea.24 Another
increasingly common symptom of the same phenomenon is China’s
insistence on serving as a counterpoint to American hegemony,25 not
only in Asia, but in other parts of the world as well, especially in
Africa.26 These issues are laden with symbolic value tied to China’s

21. See Economy, supra note 13, at 142.
22. Rising
Power,
Anxious
State,
THE
ECONOMIST,
June
23,
2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/18829149.
23. See Economy, supra note 13, at 142.
24. CHIEN-PENG CHUNG, DOMESTIC POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND CHINA’S
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 26 (RoutledgeCurzon 2004).
25. Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing’s
Fears, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 42, 44 (2012).
26. Leslie Hook & Katrina Manson, China Pledges More Investments to Africa, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES (March 25, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2bc930e-9517-11e2a4fa-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
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prestige and sense of national pride.
B. Internal State Security and Communist Party Rule
The Chinese Communist Party has ruled China since October 1,
1949 when Mao Zedong formally announced the founding of the
People’s Republic of China.27 In no other country has a single “political
party” been in power for so long in modern history. Even though China
has seen tremendous change and political turmoil since 1949, the
Communist Party has been surprisingly resilient through it all. It
survived Mao’s ill-fated Great Leap Forward and the starvation of
millions of Chinese,28 the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the destructive
Cultural Revolution,29 and the tragedy of Tiananmen Square.30 More
recently, the Communist Party has survived countless internal and
external attacks on China’s human rights abuses, widespread populist
unrest over rural land seizures, the deep social rifts caused by
urbanization, and a society increasingly characterized by huge wealth
disparity. How has it survived?
The Chinese government spends a staggering amount on internal
state security every year. China devoted U.S. $111 billion in 2012,31 and
more in 2013,32 to internal state security. This amount comprises
spending for police, state security, armed militia, courts and jails, and
other items it categorizes as “public security.”33 It spends more on its
massive internal security apparatus than on its military.34 Much of this
public security spending goes to maintaining the hold of the Communist
Party, thus explaining the long-term survival of one-party rule in China

27. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 512-15 (1990).
28. YANG JISHENG ET AL, TOMBSTONE: THE GREAT CHINESE FAMINE, 1958-1962 XXII,
XXIII (Edward Friedman et al. eds., Stacy Mosher & Guo Jian, trans. 2012).
29. JOSEPH ESHERICK ET AL, EDS., THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AS HISTORY 1
(Joseph W. Esherick et al. eds., 2006).
30. DINGXIN ZHAO, THE POWER OF TIANANMEN: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND THE 1989
BEIJING STUDENT MOVEMENT 1-2 (2004).
31. China Domestic Security Spending Rises to $111 Billion, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2012, 3:06
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/us-china-parliament-security-idUSTRE82403J
20120305; See also generally Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 303 (2004).
32. Ben Blanchard & John Ruwitch, China Hikes Defense Budget, to Spend More on Internal
Security, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 20133:49 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-chinaparliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305.
33. See China Domestic Security, supra note 31.
34. Keith B. Richburg, China Military Spending to Top $100 Billion in 2012, Alarming
Neighbors, WASH. POST March 4, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0304/world/35448587_1_path-of-peaceful-development-official-military-budget-first-aircraft-carrier.
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despite cataclysmic changes.
C. State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
China has been increasingly willing to assert its state sovereignty
and territorial integrity. China’s policies in Tibet and the South China
Sea are illustrative of the lengths to which China will go to defend this
core interest.35
Tibet. In response to President Obama’s meeting with the Dalai
Lama in early 2010, China reminded the West of the tough statement
that Deng once made, “[n]o one should expect China to swallow the
bitter [fruit] that [hurts its interest].”36 This aggressive rhetoric is a
departure from China’s usual measured tones vis-à-vis Tibet. Moreover,
China stepped up an overt and aggressive policy of cultural assimilation,
encouraging the migration of thousands of ethnic Han Chinese into
Tibet.37 China has not retreated from its aggressive policies and rhetoric
in Tibet.
South China Sea. In its relations with Asian-Pacific neighbors,
Beijing has been aggressive in maritime territorial disputes. China has
long coveted the resource-rich islands in the South China Sea.38 For
many decades, China pursued a delaying strategy and avoided both
shows of force and escalation. During the last three years of the Hu
presidency, China began to overtly and aggressively assert sovereignty
over the disputed maritime territories.39 In 2009, it even publically
extended its official territorial integrity claims beyond the traditional
areas of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang40 to include maritime territorial
claims over much of the South China Sea.
Three recent events, all occurring between 2009 and 2012, illustrate
the trend of China’s pro-activity in the South China Sea. Beginning in
2009, China made repeated diplomatic and military attempts to prevent
Vietnamese and Philippine vessels from exploring oil and gas in
disputed waters of the South China Sea.41 In 2010, China took punitive
35. Taiwan is discussed infra in Part II.A.
36. Press Conference of the PRC State Council Information Office for Contacts Between
Central Government and Dalai Lama, XINHUA (Feb. 11, 2010, 2:03 PM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-02/11/c_13172224.htm.
37. Edward Wong, China’s Money and Migrants Pour into Tibet, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
38. See CHUNG, supra note 24, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Wu Xinbo, Forging Sino-US Partnership in the Twenty-First Century: Opportunities and
Challenges, J. CONTEMP. CHINA 21:75, 391, 393 (2012).
41. Jane Perlez, Dispute Flares Over Energy in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 4,
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action by breaking off diplomatic contacts with Japan over Japan’s
detention of a Chinese trawler captain who strayed into Japanese
territorial waters.42 Lastly, in 2012, the Japanese government decided to
nationalize the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea
by purchasing them from a private seller, which set off a furor.43
Chinese public outrage against Japan ran high, resulting in widespread
protests and looting aimed at Japanese businesses. For example, crowds
of angry protesters shut down a factory in China in 2012.44 In each of
these incidents, China brought into play its naval superiority, flexing its
muscles in a manner reminiscent of war games in the China/Taiwan
Formosa Strait, but rarely seen elsewhere. Each of the three incidents
led to diplomatic crises, in addition to nadirs in China’s relationship with
its neighbors.
D. Economic Development and Social Stability
The story of China’s astonishing economic success is inextricably
linked to the success of the Chinese Communist Party. Since Deng’s
economic reforms, the Party has tied its fate to continued economic
growth, largely driven by an export-oriented economy. The Communist
Party has staked its legitimacy on its ability to sustain economic growth.
Some commentators have noted that the Chinese Communist Party
pursues economic growth as if its life depended on it, which may well be
true.45
China’s rapid economic expansion has lifted millions out of poverty
and created a hitherto unknown middle class. But it has come at a great
cost. Just to name a few of the problems that China faces that make the
headlines in and out of China regularly: environmental degradation,46
scarcity in natural resources,47 corruption,48 social upheaval,49 public
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/world/asia/china-vietnam-and-india-fight-over-energyexploration-in-south-china-sea.html?_r=0.
42. Yuri Kageyama, Chinese Boat Skipper Arrested Off Japan’s Coast, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 7, 2011, 9:41 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/chinese-boat-skipper-arrested-off-japans-coast010649940.html.
43. Panasonic, Toyota Report Damages in China as Protests Widen, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16,
2012, 5:34 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-16/panasonic-plant-in-china-on-fire-asanti-japan-protests-escalate.html.
44. Id.
45. JOHN KNIGHT & SAI DING, CHINA’S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH 295 (2012).
46. Damien Ma, Before and After Hu: Is China Better Off Than It Was Ten Years Ago?,
FOREIGN AFF. 2-3 (2012).
47. Id.
48. Eric X. Li, The Life of the Party: The Post-Democratic Future Begins in China, 92
FOREIGN AFF. 34, 39 (2013).
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health crises,50 wealth disparity,51 and erosion of traditional values52
(such as caring for the elderly, who are now often abandoned in the
country by their children who work in cities). These myriad problems
explain in part why China spends so much on maintaining internal
security. Another key element of the social stability equation is the rise
of a large politically savvy and active middle class. Increasingly, this
new middle class desires not only the economic privileges of their
counterparts in the West, but also their social and political freedoms.
Until now, there has been a silent détente, with the middle class staying
relatively quiescent in exchange for the direct benefit of continued
economic gains. However, how much longer can the détente last?
III. CORE INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
This section considers how China’s three core interests find
expression in its trade policies. The section proceeds in two parts. First,
it provides illustrations of how China’s trade policy links up to the three
core interests. Second, it explores how each of the three core interests
has found expression in international economic law litigation, seen
through the lens of domestic and WTO trade remedies cases. In
particular, the ongoing dispute between the United States and China over
solar energy subsidies illustrates how deeply the core interests are
intermeshed with trade policies. This section also considers China’s
other major WTO cases, arguing that each of the central cases China has
either brought or the strategy chosen to defend a case are driven, in
whole or in part, by the furtherance of one of the three core interests.
A. Linkages Between Regional East Asian Trade Policy and Core
Interests
All countries align foreign and domestic policies with trade policy,
although views on the extent of alignment or even the desirability of
alignment may vary.53 One common integration principle is that foreign
49. John W. Schoen, China’s Wealth Gap Strains Social Fabric, NBCNEWS.COM (Oct. 20,
2010, 10:36 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39546204/.
50. Yanzhong Huang, The Sick Man of Asia: China’s Health Crisis, 10 FOREIGN AFF. 119,
124 (2011).
51. See Ma, supra note 46, at 2-3.
52. Benjamin Cost, China’s Aging Population Poses Problems for Economy and Tradition,
SHANGHAIIST (Mar. 22, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://shanghaiist.com/2012/03/22/chinas_aging_
population.php.
53. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé?, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES,
Fall 1987, at 131-44, cited in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
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and domestic policy goals must be balanced with the desire to maintain
friendly trade relations with existing trading partners or open up trade
opportunities with new partners. For example, Country A’s decision to
host a formal state visit from Country B may be driven, in part, by a
desire to trade more with Country B. Similarly, the value of making
condemnatory statements on Country C’s human rights record may be
balanced against the desire to maintain friendly trade relations with
Country C. The interlinked nature of decisions makes it difficult to
distill a single motive behind each decision. Nonetheless, it is possible
to discern trends in the salience of one among many motives in the
conduct of foreign affairs. In the past ten years, one can identify a
cohesive trend of increased assertion of China’s core interests.
Taiwan is a particularly salient example of the close relationship
between Chinese foreign policy objectives and trade policy. China’s
insistence on the One-China policy is a cornerstone of its sovereignty
core interest. As a result of the One-China policy, Taiwan’s status as a
member of the community of nations is fraught with confusion. Taiwan
has struggled to carve out a policy space for itself because of its
ambiguous status in international law. Due to China’s strong-arming,
just twenty-five nations have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.54
The lack of official diplomatic recognition also hampers Taiwan’s trade
relations. Taiwan is party to only five free trade agreements: El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Panama.55 In contrast,
China has fourteen free trade agreement partners comprised of thirty-one
economies56 and is actively negotiating many more, in addition to
investment treaties.57 Interestingly, Taiwan is a member of the WTO,
but only through a protracted negotiated compromise reached during
China’s accession process where the two nations raced to the finish line
for WTO membership, with China joining on December 11, 200158 and
Taiwan soon thereafter on January 1, 2002.59 Taiwan feared that if
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 24-29 (4th ed. 2003).
54. Diplomatic Allies, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN),
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Regions/AlliesIndex/?opno=f8505044-f8dd-4fc9-b5b50da9d549c979.
55. See FTAs Signed with Trading Partners, BUREAU OF FOREIGN TRADE,
http://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=672.
56. MOFCOM, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml.
57. For an analysis of China’s evolving investment treaty program, see generally Stephan W.
Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment Treaties of the People’s
Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 (2007).
58. See Member Information – China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm.
59. See Member Information – Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and
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China were to become a WTO member first, it would vote to block
Taiwan’s membership. Thus, Taiwan felt it had no choice but to
negotiate quickly to join the WTO at the same time as China. In
exchange for a speedy accession process, Taiwan agreed to join as a
developed nation and made other costly concessions.60
In the South China Sea, China’s sovereignty claims come into
direct conflict with its trade interests in the area. China’s recent
relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”)
and the East Asia Free Trade Area have deteriorated substantially in
recent years due to territorial claims in the South China Sea. The dispute
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is just the most recent and highly
publicized episode. The South China Sea links the Pacific and Indian
Oceans and has some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Several
Asian countries claim sovereignty over the South China Sea, whose
waters are believed to be rich in oil and gas. China claims virtually the
entire sea, while the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia
claim various parts.61 China’s aggressive military policing of the South
China Sea raised tensions with its neighbors to new peaks throughout
2012. The crisis has not abated. New rules that came into effect on
January 1, 2013, allow police in the southern Chinese province of
Hainan to board and seize control of foreign ships that “illegally enter”
Chinese waters and order them to change course.62 In November 2013,
tensions rose over China’s patrolling of a newly declared air zone over
the disputed South China Sea Islands.63
Meanwhile, China is supposedly working on closer economic
integration with the very same countries whose territorial claims it
disputes in the South China Sea. In the background are China’s ongoing
efforts to foster a closer economic partnership with ASEAN, particularly
through the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation initiative in which China,
Japan, and South Korean pledge to work closely with ASEAN’s
members on a wide range of trade, development, economic, and social

Matsu
(Chinese
Taipei)
and
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm.
60. See Lee J. Brenner, The Effect of China’s WTO Accession on Taiwan,
LEEJBRENNER.COM, http://www.leejbrenner.com/The_Effect_of_China%27s_WTO_.html.
61. Matthew Bigg, ASEAN Chief Says China Plan on Disputed Seas Escalates Tension,
REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2012, 2:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/us-china-seasasean-idUSBRE8AT09120121130.
62. Id.
63. Jane Perlez & Martin Fackler, China Patrols Air Zone Over Disputed Islands, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/world/asia/japan-south-korea-flymilitary-planes-in-zone-set-by-china.html?_r=0.
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issues.64 Progress on the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation plan has
stalled largely due to tensions in the South China Sea. The same is true
for the East Asia Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”), encompassing the
same ASEAN Plus Three membership. An East Asian FTA would have
economic benefits (as well as disadvantages and displacement events),
but would also foster closer regional interdependence, leading to
possible reductions of social and political tensions.65 However, there is
little forward movement with ASEAN due to China’s aggressive policies
in the South China Sea, policies that have entrenched the rivalry between
China and Japan. Leadership and cooperation between China and Japan
would be necessary for the creation of an East Asia FTA, but the two
countries have rival and divergent views on regional security. China
stands to gain a great deal from an East Asia FTA,66 particularly in new
potential export markets. However, the core interest of continued
economic development is pitted against the competing interests of
regional hegemony, control over valuable resources (oil and gas reserves
in the South China Sea, also essential for economic development), and
territorial sovereignty. It is not surprising that cooperation with ASEAN
is getting short shrift.
Particularly in regional politics, trade relations are reflective of and
even subservient to regional hegemonic and sovereignty concerns.
China’s policies vis-à-vis Taiwan and its ASEAN neighbors in the South
China Sea are explicable only in terms of core interests of sovereignty
and regional hegemonic dominance. This can also be understood in
terms of China’s need to maintain internal stability by aggressively
pursuing alternative sources of energy to fuel its economic expansion.
The next section explores how core interests play out in trade disputes in
light of these core interests.
B. Case Study – Solar Industry Trade Dispute
The solar energy industry presents a timely and salient case study
of how China’s core interests can place China on a political and
economic collision course with its largest trading partners - the United
States and the European Union. China has been investing very heavily
in the solar industry, both privately and publically, through government
64. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation,
ASEAN.ORG (OCT. 23, 2012), http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/asean-3/item/aseanplus-three-cooperation.
65. Shujiro Urata, Towards an East Asia Free Trade Area, OECD DEVELOPMENT CENTRE
POLICY INSIGHTS, 4 http://www.oecd.org/dev/31098183.pdf.
66. Id. at 4.
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subsidies, loans, and other policies. The solar industry is an important
cornerstone of China’s export-driven economic growth policy, as well as
its desire to have sustainable sources to satisfy its ever-increasing
domestic energy demand. Increased demand for energy and other
resources presents a tinderbox of social stability issues for the Chinese
government, pressured to respond to skyrocketing demand for resources.
Thus, the solar industry provides a direct lens into two core Chinese
interests – economic growth through export expansion and maintaining
domestic social stability.
1. Brief Overview of Renewable Energy Investments
Renewable energy now comprises a significant portion of global
investment in the energy industry. In 2011, 16.7 percent of all global
energy investment went toward renewable energy.67 The United Nations
reported that investment in renewable energy reached a record U.S. $257
billion in 2011, representing a 17 percent increase from 2010.68 In 2012,
China was responsible for one-fifth of all investments in renewable
energy, spending U.S. $52 billion, slightly topping the United States’
share of U.S. $51 billion.69 Germany, Italy, and India comprise the next
top tier of countries making large renewable energy investments.70 Solar
and wind made up 8.2 percent of global investment in renewables.71
Renewable energy supplies only 4.7 percent of the world’s electricity,72
so there is great growth potential for industry. The level of investment
means the solar energy industry may be poised for extraordinary growth.
In 2011, solar led the renewable energy industry with U.S. $147 billion
in global investment.73
Solar energy’s impressive growth is due its increasing viability as
an economically efficient energy source. Enough sunlight hits the Earth
in one hour to power the world’s energy needs for an entire year.74 A
plot of solar panels covering an area of 100 miles by 100 miles would
67. See Jack Perkowski, China Leads the World in Renewable Energy Investment, FORBES
(July 27, 2012, 9:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/07/27/china-leads-theworld-in-renewable-energy-investment/.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Renewable Power, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/statisticalreview-of-world-energy-2013/review-by-energy-type/renewable-energy/renewable-power-.html.
73. Perkowski, supra note 67.
74. Jeff Himmelman, The Secret to Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/the-secret-to-solar-power.html?pagewanted=all.
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power the United States for a day.75 Of course, much of the potential is
not practically harvestable, but investors are beginning to appreciate
solar energy’s potential.76 Consumers are also embracing solar energy.
More consumers are installing solar panels worldwide. In the United
States, companies have discovered the best way to market solar energy
for commercial and residential use is through leasing solar panels,77
reaping more profits for the company and savings for the consumer.78
This new approach coupled with state and local incentives (such as
significant rebates) have boosted both consumer demand and investment
in solar power.79
2. U.S. Solar Industry
In 2010, the United States consumed 8 percent of its energy from
renewables. Of the renewable energy, solar energy comprised only 1
percent.80 Nonetheless, solar power demand has grown quickly as the
price of solar panels in the United States decreased from $50 per watt in
1975 to 84 cents per watt in 2012, a 97.2 percent drop.81 The Wall
Street Journal reports, “the U.S. is on pace to install as much solar power
this year as it did in this century’s entire first decade: at least 2,500
megawatts, the equivalent of more than two nuclear-power plants.”82
Many of these solar panels, however, will come from foreign companies.
“[Photovoltaic] imports have been rising for several reasons: (1)
increasing crystalline silicon (c-Si) module production in places like
China, Malaysia, and the Philippines; (2) an emergent U.S. market,
responding to the falling price of solar energy; and (3) favorable state
polices in key markets like California.”83 Currently, two-thirds of all
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. The State of Colorado, for instance, has programs that offer rebates and payments that
cover 20 percent to 30 percent of a given solar system’s costs, including installation. Combined with
a 30 percent federal tax credit available to all Americans, a consumer could potentially subsidize
more than 50 percent of the costs. Colorado Solar Incentives, WHOLESALE SOLAR, (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.wholesalesolar.com/solarincentives/Coloradosolarpanels.html.
80. Renewable & Alternative Fuels: Trends in Renewable Energy Consumption and
Electricity, EIA (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/renewable/annual/trends/.
81. Ryan Tracy & Cassandra Sweet, Fueled by Cheap Chinese Panels, U.S. Solar Use Soars,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443589304
577637333545350176.html.
82. Id.
83. MICHAELA D. PLATZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42509, U.S. SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC
MANUFACTURING: INDUSTRY TRENDS, GLOBAL COMPETITION, FEDERAL SUPPORT 19 (2012).
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solar panels imported in the U.S. come from Asia.84 China accounts for
56 percent of all imports into the United States.85
3. China’s Solar Industry
China is the second largest economy in the world, but the biggest
consumer of energy. China now accounts for 21 percent of all global
energy consumption – greater than even the United States (see Figure 1
below).86

Source: Mamta Badkar, The Ultimate Guide to China’s Voracious Energy
Use,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Aug.
17,
2012,
10:24
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-energy-use-2012-8?op=1.

China’s energy use increased 150 percent in the past decade, and
although per capita energy use remains small relative to the United
States, its growing middle class and surging economic development
means that per capita use will continue to rise.87 Of all renewable
energies, including hydropower, solar energy comprises only 1 percent
of renewable energy use in China.88
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Mamta Badkar, The Ultimate Guide to China’s Voracious Energy Use, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-energy-use-20128?op=1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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Renewable energy, especially solar, thus comprises a tiny portion
of China’s energy portfolio. However, China is investing heavily in
renewable energy. In 2012, China was responsible for one-fifth of all
investment in renewable energy, spending U.S. $52 billion, compared
with the United States at U.S. $51 billion.89 China intends to spend an
additional U.S. $457 billion over the next five years and has set a goal to
consume 20 percent of its energy from renewable sources by 2020.90
U.S. $39.5 billion will be invested in the solar energy industry alone in
2015.91 Moreover, “China’s official goal is to install 10 gigawatts of
solar panels a year by 2015, using 20-year contracts to guarantee
payment for electricity purchased from them.”92
China’s ability to manufacture solar panels is tremendous. GTM
Research, a renewable energy consulting firm in Boston, estimated that
in 2012 Chinese companies had the ability to manufacture 50 gigawatts
of solar panels per year, while the Chinese domestic market was on track
to absorb only four to five gigawatts.93
China currently exports 95 percent of all the solar panels it
produces.94 However, the proportion of solar panel exported will likely
decline as domestic consumption expands.95 China supplied half of the
world’s solar panels in 2012, an increase from one-fifth in 2008, making
it the largest producer in the world.96 By comparison, the United States
exported only three percent of the world’s solar panels in 2012, down
from seven percent in 2008.97 China’s aggressive pursuit of export
markets for solar panels has placed it on a collision course with both the
United States and the European Union.

89. Perkowski, supra note 67.
90. PLATZER, supra note 83, at 17.
91. Jamie Yap, China’s Solar Power Investment to Hit $39.5B by 2015, ZDNET (Sept. 14,
2012, 5:27 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/cn/chinas-solar-power-investment-to-hit-39-5b-by-20157000004255/.
92. Keith Bradsher, Glut of Solar Panels Poses a New Threat to China, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/business/global/glut-of-solar-panels-is-a-new-test-forchina.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1349732602Pkl7Q3HlyTDqztjR8bM3WQ.
93. Id.
94. John Mathews, Solar Panels in China: An Emerging U.S.-China Trade Dispute? THE
GLOBALIST (Jan. 19, 2012) http://www.theglobalist.com/solar-panels-in-china-an-emerging-u-schina-trade-dispute/.
95. See PLATZER, supra note 83.
96. Tracy & Sweet, supra note 81; Leslie Hook, Cloud Hovers Over China’s Solar Industry,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bef02db6-1c26-11e2-a63b00144feabdc0.html#axzz2CVY9wR9l.
97. Tracy & Sweet, supra note 81.
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4. Financial Hard Times for the Solar Industry
Despite positive growth and massive production capacity, the solar
energy industry has fallen on hard times. The influx of Chinese solar
panels onto the world market has created an oversupply that vastly
outstrips demand by almost twofold.98 This oversupply has caused a
precipitous decline in prices, hurting solar panel companies around the
world. When China’s solar panel producers are financially troubled, so
are, by extension, many state-owned banks that have loaned about U.S.
$18 billion to these companies at low interest rates.99 In 2012, China’s
largest solar panel producers suffered a loss of approximately U.S. $1.00
for every U.S. $3.00 of sales because prices have fallen by three-fourths
since 2008.100 Wholesale prices for solar panels dropped by 50 percent
in 2012.101 Suntech, one of China’s largest solar panel producers, has
cut its production by 40 percent, its share price has dropped by 60
percent, and it even received a delisting warning from the New York
Stock Exchange in late 2012.102 Trina Solar Limited, another large
Chinese solar panel manufacturer, saw its shares drop by 85 percent over
the past three years.103 Rory MacPherson, a spokesperson for Suntech,
admits, “[i]t is not a Chinese industry problem, it is a global solar
industry problem . . . It is primarily the result of an imbalance between
supply and demand False”104 Jack Perkowski, a writer for Forbes
Magazine, claims, “[t]he economics for the solar industry, both globally
and in China, have never been worse, and there are no bright spots on
the horizon.”105
5. Context of Solar Subsidies Disputes
The solar industry is politically important for both China and the
United States in a number of ways. The Obama administration has
prioritized creating new manufacturing jobs through building the

98. See Ucilia Wang, Report: Solar Panel Supply Will Far Exceed Demand Beyond 2012,
FORBES (June 27, 2012 9:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/06/27/report-solarpanel-production-will-far-exceed-demand-beyond-2012/.
99. James Kanter & Keith Bradsher, Europe and China Agree to Settle Solar Panel Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/business/global/european-unionand-china-settle-solar-panel-fight.html?_r=0.
100. Id.
101. Wang, supra note 98.
102. Hook, supra note 96.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Perkowski, supra note 67.
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renewable energy sector, including solar energy. The White House’s
website highlights “Securing American Energy”106 by “deploy[ing]
American assets, innovation, and technology so that we can safely and
responsibly develop more energy here at home and be a leader in the
global energy economy.”107 The United States justifies renewable
energy subsidies as supporting a potentially strategic infant industry, one
that requires help so it can compete both globally and with other
conventional energy sources.108 China subsidizes its own solar energy
industry for similar reasons. Solar power is seen as one of the nascent
fields in which China can effectively compete on a global scale, securing
new export markets while providing a green energy source for its everincreasing domestic needs. Both China and the United States are
investing heavily in renewable energy, and both countries have made it a
political and economic priority.
China and the United States are now embroiled in trade disputes
over green energy subsidies109 aimed at photovoltaic (“PV”) solar
panels.110 The U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) and the U.S.
International Trade Commission (“ITC”) both approved imposing
countervailing duties (“CVD”) on heavily subsidized imported PV solar
China, in response, launched its own
panels from China.111
investigations, finding that the United States also illegally subsidizes its
solar energy industry.112 According to Scott Lincicome, an international
trade attorney with White and Case, LLP, trade between China and the
United States in the solar industry is just more than three billion
dollars.113 While this is not a large percentage of overall United StatesChina trade flow, the world’s two strongest economies are nonetheless
in stiff competition to establish their own domestic industries in these
technologies. The stakes between China and the United States are seen
106. Develop and Secure America’s Energy Resources, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 13, 2013)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/securing-american-energy.
107. Id.
108. Mark Muro, Do We Need Subsidies for Solar and Wind Power, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8,
2012), http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444032404578008183300454400.
html?mg=reno-wsj.
109. For a succinct and persuasive discussion of the economic and political rationale for
regulating subsidies, see MICHAEL K. YOUNG, UNITED STATES TRADE LAW AND POLICY 68-70
(2001).
110. Michael Bastasch, Report: US Green Energy Subsidies Jeopardize American Companies,
Global Markets, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 9, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/09/
report-green-energy-subsidies-jeopardize-us-companies-global-markets/.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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as enormous due to the importance of solar as one of the pathways to
“energy independence.”114
6. China’s Current Solar Disputes
On October 19, 2011, SolarWorld Industries America, Inc., the
largest producer of crystalline silicon PV products in the United States
and a member of the Coalition for American Solar Manufacturers
(“CASM”), filed a petition for countervailing duties against China at the
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) and the International Trade Court
(“ITC”).115 The investigation covered the time period from January 1,
2010, through December 31, 2010.116 The petition sought to impose
countervailing duties (“CVDs”) on imported PV panels from China to
counteract government subsidies. SolarWorld asserted in the petition
that Chinese solar panel manufacturers receive “a wide range of illegal
subsidies from the Chinese government, including massive cash grants,
discounted raw material inputs such as polysilicon and aluminum;
heavily discounted land; power and water; multibillion-dollar
preferential loans and directed credit; tax exemptions, incentives and
rebates; export assistance grants; and export insurance at referential
rates.”117 Additionally, the petition claimed that the Chinese government
granted more than U.S. $30 billion in subsidies to its domestic solar
energy industry in 2010, with at least two billion dollars going to
Suntech.118
On March 20, 2012, in its preliminary findings, the DOC found that
“at least 10 categories of Chinese subsidy programs are WTO-illegal and
announce[d] its decision to impose a preliminary duty of 4.73 percent on
U.S. imports from Trina Solar, 2.9 percent from Suntech, and 3.6
percent from all other remaining Chinese manufacturers.”119 It also
made a preliminary finding of “critical circumstances,” meaning the
CVDs would apply retroactively to December 2011.120 On October 17,
2012, the DOC confirmed in its final determination that “countervailable
subsidies are being provided to producers and exporters of crystalline
114. Id.
115. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-481,
731-TA-1190, USITC Pub. 4295, at 2 (Dec. 2011) (Preliminary).
116. Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, From China: Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 77 FED. REG. 63788 (Oct. 17, 2012).
FOR
AM.
SOLAR
MFG.,
117. See
Fact
Sheet,
COALITION
http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org/fact-sheet/.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Supra note 116.
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silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or not assembled into modules (solar
cells) from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).”121
The ITC, in its final determination on November 7, 2012,
unanimously found “that a U.S. industry is materially injured by reason
of imports of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells and modules from
China that the DOC has determined are subsidized and sold in the
United States at less than fair value.”122 The only portion the ITC did
not uphold was the application of “critical circumstances,” meaning the
ITC disallowed retroactive duties.123 Trina Solar and Suntech were the
primary targets of these duties as they comprised the “lion’s share” of
exports to the United States.124 The final ruling assigned to Suntech a
CVD of 14.78 percent and a 15.97 percent CVD to Trina Solar, while all
other exporters were assigned a rate of 15.24 percent.125 The final tariff
schedules are depicted in Figure 2 below:

Source: Eric Wesoff, Final ITC Decision on SolarWorld’s China-US
Solar
Trade
Complaint,
GREENTECHMEDIA
(Nov.
7,
2012),
http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/case-casm.

In the wake of these rulings, the Chinese government has already
launched its own investigations into subsidies for the U.S.’s domestic
solar energy industry. The first two investigations found that the United
States is using prohibited subsidies, and China is now considering
whether or not to complain to the WTO or to take other remedial
121. Id.
122. Crystalline Silicone Photovoltaic Cells and Modules from China Injure U.S. Industry,
USITC
(Nov.
7,
2012),
Says
USITC,
http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2012/er1107kk1.htm.
123. Eric Wesoff, Final ITC Decision on SolarWorld’s China-US Solar Trade Complaint,
GREENTECHMEDIA (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/case-casm.
124. Charles W. Thurston, Breaking: ITC Makes Unanimous Decision on Chinese Cell &
Modules, RENEWABLENERGYWORLD.COM (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/
rea/news/article/2012/11/commerce-slams-chinese-cell-modules-with-final-duties.
125. Id.
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action.126 The Chinese case is not without merit. The Energy
Information Administration, an independent arm of the Department of
Energy, found that subsidies for energy markets in the United States rose
from $17.9 billion in 2007 to $37.2 billion in 2010.127 Also in 2010,
U.S. subsidies for renewable energy increased 186 percent, from $5.1
billion to $14.7 billion, with solar energy receiving more than $1 billion
in 2010.128 The potential for complaints on both sides notwithstanding,
the U.S. is poised to bring its own complaints to the WTO soon.
The United States has the option of filing a complaint against China
at the WTO.129 The countervailing duties are already in place, as
recently approved by the ITC, and the legal arguments have been tested
and heard by both DOC and ITC. The United States will claim that its
domestic industry is materially injured or is threatened with material
injury130 due to China’s subsidization of its solar panels.
The United States could present three potential claims, and it could
assert all three at once, or a combination of them. First, the United
States could allege that China is engaging in red-light, or prohibited
export-contingent subsidies, which are automatically illegal under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties131 (the “SCM
126.
127.

See Bastasch, supra note110.
Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2010,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 2011), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf.
128. Id. at xiii.
129. Under the WTO system, member nations confronted with illegal subsidies may choose
between either a multilateral solution or a unilateral one, but not both simultaneously or
cumulatively. The aggrieved party can initiate a WTO dispute settlement procedure to seek the
removal of the subsidy by another WTO member. In such a dispute, the SCM Agreement governs.
In the alternative, it can choose to unilaterally impose a countervailing (or off-setting) duty on the
subsidized import. The unilateral approach usually begins when a domestic industry injured by
subsidized imports from another country initiates a countervailing duty investigation under its
country’s domestic laws. If the investigation finds that the subsidy is present and is more than de
minimus (more than 1 percent of the ad valorum value), then it can impose a duty on the subsidized
import that countervails or offsets the financial advantage of the subsidy. The findings of the
domestic countervailing duty investigation are also subject to WTO review under the SCM
Agreement. The countervailing duty is designed solely to level the playing field by neutralizing the
effect of the subsidy. It is not punitive, nor does it require the subsidizing foreign government to
remove its subsidy, although it creates pressure to do so by removing the benefit of the subsidy, at
least for the one relevant import market. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
(Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM
Agreement]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
130. For an excellent exposition of the challenges involved in prosecuting “injury to domestic
industry” or “nullification and impairment” claims, see Richard H. Steinberg & Timothy E. Josling,
When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal
Challenge, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 369, 379-85 (2003).
131. See SCM Agreement, supra note 129.
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Agreement”). Second, the United States may argue that China is
engaging in yellow-light, actionable subsidies that have caused serious
prejudice to the U.S. domestic industry through price suppression.
Third, the United States could claim that China’s is engaging in yellowlight subsidies that are causing material injury to the U.S. domestic
industry. Subsidies cases are legally and factually complex. Because
such WTO cases rely heavily on industry-specific economic data, it is
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the technical aspects of
potential claims in any detail.132 However, an overview of the most
salient threshold questions is beneficial to the core interest discussion
because it highlights the ways in which the core interests are expressed
in China’s support of the solar industry.
The United States must first establish that specific subsidies exist.
As noted above, a subsidy exists when a government or public body has
made a financial contribution in the form of direct or indirect transfer of
funds, loans, grants, tax credits, and the provision of goods and
services.133 Secondly, it must show that a benefit to China’s solar
industry has been conferred.134 Lastly, the subsidy must be specific to
China’s solar energy industry.135
The United States will likely be able to establish that China is
subsidizing its solar energy industry. The United States can argue that
the Chinese government has made financial contributions in several
forms. Reuters reported that on December 12, 2012, the Chinese
government allocated seven billion yuan (U.S. $1.1 billion) to its solar
industry, taking China’s total subsidization this year to 13 billion yuan
(U.S. $2 billion).136 State-run banks, which can, depending on their
actions and duties, be considered a “public body,”137 have given these
132. See generally Janie Hauser, From Sleeping Giant to Friendly Giant: Rethinking the
United States Solar Energy Trade War with China, N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG, 1062, 1063,
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/journals/ncilj/issues/volume38/issue-4-summer-2013/fromsleeping-giant-to-friendly-giant-rethinking-theunited-states-solar-energy-trade-war-with-china/.
133. Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1).
134. Id. at art. 1.1(b).
135. Id. at art. 2.
136. Swetha Gopinath & Krishna N Das, China Doubles Solar Subsidies, U.S.-Listed Stocks
Jump, REUTERS (Dec 12, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/uschinesesolarcompanies-shares-idUSBRE8BB16B20121212.
137. “The Appellate Body also found that the USDOC had not acted inconsistently with the
same obligations in determining, on the basis of evidence relating inter alia to the Government of
China’s role in the banking sector, that certain State-owned commercial banks that provided loans to
investigated companies constituted ‘public bodies.’” United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds379_e.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2013) (the case summary provides a
brief explanation of the case’s findings).
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companies U.S. $18 billion in low-interest loans.138 Domestic programs,
such as China’s goal to install ten gigawatts of solar panels per year until
2015, is driven by twenty-year guaranteed government contracts to pay
for the electricity produced.139 Over this timeframe, this would amount
to U.S. $50 billion in subsidies, according to Li Junfeng of the National
Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic planning
agency in the form of guaranteed government contracts.140 China
recently announced it will reinstate its programs known as Building
Integrated Photovoltaic (“BIPV”) and “Golden Sun.”141 BIPV, in its
first rendition, subsidized costs at fifteen yuan per watt for rooftop
systems and twenty yuan per watt for BIPV systems.142 China’s media
outlets reports this amounted to 1.2 billion yuan in 2009.143 Golden Sun
offered 50 percent of investments for solar projects over 500 MW
including the necessary distribution networks within two to three
years.144 For rural projects not connected to the grid, China offered to
contribute 70 percent of the investment.145 The financial contributions
are clear: direct transfers of funds, loans, and guaranteed government
contracts.
Secondly, considering the raw numbers, it would be difficult to
argue these contributions have not conferred a benefit. A benefit means
the companies are better off than they otherwise would have been
relative to the world marketplace. China’s spike in solar panel
production, such that it now accounts for 50 percent of all global trade
and vastly outperforms all other countries, is a strong indication that
these subsidies have benefitted its domestic solar energy industry
relative to the global trade market.146 Finally, these subsidies are
specific because they are targeted at and limited to a specific industry,
138. See Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The Golden Sun of China, PVGROUP, http://www.pvgroup.org/events/ctr_031358;
China: Golden Sun Subsidies Announced – 50% on Large Scale Solar Projects, CLEANERGY.ORG
(Jul. 22, 2009), http://cleanergy.blogspot.com/2009/07/china-golden-sun-subsidies-announced50.html.
142. The Golden Sun of China, supra note 141.
143. China’s National Solar Subsidy Programs, CHINA POLICY IN FOCUS,
https://sites.google.com/site/chinapolicyinfocus/china-s-solar-subsidy-programs/china-s-solarindustry/china-s-national-solar-subsidy-programs.
144. Robert D. Kaplan, The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on
Land and at Sea?, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 23 (2010).
145. Id.
146. Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme, Annual Report 2011, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY,
46 (2011), www.iea-pvps.org/index.php?id=6&eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1129 [hereinafter
IEA].
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the solar energy industry. These subsides are not available for other
enterprises based on fulfilling objective criteria for eligibility. The solar
energy industry is the sole recipient of these subsidies, thus they are
specific.
Although little public information exists that definitively states
China is providing prohibited subsidies, one glaring statistic strongly
suggests China may be doing so. In 2011, China exported 95 percent of
all PV solar panels, with only five percent absorbed by its domestic
market. It is difficult to imagine that China, even with only a fraction of
its energy consumption from solar, can absorb only five percent of its
production capacity. Such a discrepancy is highly suspicious and
suggests that instead of marketing solar panels to the domestic market,
companies export them to receive further subsidies. Additionally, China
has been the largest PV producer in the world since 2007, achieving a
more than 100 percent increase in production capacity each year since
2007.147 In 2011, China’s solar panels accounted for 50 percent of all
global trade in solar panels.148 Such extreme export-orientation is
difficult to ignore.
The United States would present a similar argument. As noted
above, China has pumped roughly U.S. $2 billion into its solar energy
industry this year, U.S. $30 billion in 2010, and forecasts show China
will spend another U.S. $50 billion in the next 20 years.149 China’s
gross revenue on imports to the United States was more than three
billion dollars,150 thus subsidies were roughly 65 percent of China’s
revenue on imports to the United States. China also accounted for half
of the world’s exports in solar panels last year, giving it substantial
influence on the world market for prices.151 Its production capacity
alone outweighs the world’s demand for solar panels.152
The United States would argue that this subsidization program has
driven China’s tremendous solar panel production expansion. As a
result, solar panel prices have fallen by three-fourths since 2008,153 the
same year China began this expansion, and wholesale prices dropped 50
percent within the last year and continue to fall.154 Between 2008 and
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Gopinath & Das, supra note 136; see also Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99; Fact
Sheet, supra note 117.
150. See Bastasch, supra note 110.
151. IEA, supra note 146.
152. See Wang, supra note 98; see also Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99.
153. See Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99.
154. See Wang, supra note 98.
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2010, according to CASM, China’s solar exports rose 350 percent, and
its production capacity rose by over 100 percent every year for the past
five years.155 The glut of Chinese solar panels on the world market is
significant and has a dramatic effect on world prices. The United States
is likely to be able to show that China’s subsidization program has
caused the United States domestic solar energy industry serious
prejudice through price suppression and violated the SCM Agreement
and its obligations under the WTO. Therefore, unless China and the
U.S. can reach a political compromise similar to the resolution reached
in the China –European Union dispute (described below), the U.S. has a
sound basis for seeking redress before the WTO.
7. China’s Solar Disputes with the European Union
China’s solar industry subsidies have spilled over to both sides of
the Atlantic. “The row over solar technology is one of the most
contentious in current world-trade disputes, increasing tensions between
Beijing, Washington and Brussels.”156 The European Union (‘EU”) has
also accused China of unfairly subsidizing its solar panel firms,157
thereby allowing Chinese firms to dump below-cost solar panels into
their markets and undercutting rival European producers.158 In 2012, it
is estimated that about twenty one billion euros (U.S. $28 billion) worth
of low-cost solar panels were imported from China into European
countries, forcing several European solar firms to shut their doors.159 As
tensions continued to escalate, the E.U. Trade Commissioner responded
by enacting punitive tariffs on China’s manufactured solar panels, a
threat opposed by some E.U. national governments.160 China countered
by threatening to impose duties on European imports of polysilicon, a
material used in solar panels, and wine.161 China also filed a WTO

155. See IEA, supra note 146; see also Fact Sheet, supra note 117.
156. Id.
157. EU to Investigate Chinese Solar Panel Subsidies, BBC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:15 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20249003 [hereinafter EU to Investigate]; Dinny McMahon &
Carlos Tejada, China Complains to WTO Over EU Solar Subsidies, WALL ST. J. (November 5,
2012, 10:17 AM), http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204349404578100741581
635834.html?mg=reno64-wsj.
158. Robin Emmot & Ben Blanchard, EU, China Resolve Solar Dispute – Their Biggest Trade
Row by Far, REUTERS (July 27, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/27/us-eu-chinasolar-idUSBRE96Q03Z20130727.
159. Id.
160. V.V.V., Sabres Rattled and Ready, THE ECONOMIST (July 30, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/07/european-trade.
161. Id.
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complaint against the European Union for subsidizing its solar
components such as poly-silicon.162
With the global price of solar panels being driven down by overproduction and China’s unfair trade practices, and with tariffs levied
against China by its largest export market for solar panel products,163
both China and the European Union were motivated to take a seat at the
negotiation table. After six weeks of discussion, the European Union
and Chinese solar-panel producers announced an agreement on July 27,
2013, defusing the long-standing trade dispute.164 In a statement
regarding the negotiated resolution, European trade commissioner Karel
De Gucht announced, “[w]e have found an amicable solution that will
result in a new equilibrium on the European solar panel market at a
sustainable price level.”165 China agreed to set a minimum price for its
solar panels at 56 euro cents per watt (74 cents), a “near spot market
price,”166 of as much as 7 gigawatts in the European Union market until
the end of 2015.167 If China’s producers do not adhere to these
conditions, they will find themselves subject to the European Union’s
antidumping tariffs set to sharply increase from 11.8 percent to an
average of nearly 50 percent.168 Thus, the European Union –China solar
dispute may rear its head again.
8. The Solar Energy Dispute from China’s Core Interests
Perspective
China is unlikely to back down significantly from its multipronged
support of the solar energy industry. The core interest analysis helps to
lay bare the stakes from China’s perspective. Sustainable energy
sources development is a keystone in China’s stable economic
development. China is keen to wean itself of dependence on fossil fuels,
especially coal, for a host of environmental169, public health170,
162. McMahon & Tejada, supra note 157.
163. EU and China Agree Minimum Import Price Near Spot Price, CNBC (July 29, 2013,
12:53 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100919695.
164. Jonathan Steams, European Commission Approves Chinese Solar-Panel Trade Pact,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-02/eu-solar-panelaccord-with-china-approved-by-european-commission.
165. Kanter & Bradsher, supra note 99.
166. See Moore, supra note 5.
167. Art Patnaude & Gabriele Steinhauser, EU, China Reach Agreement on Solar-Panel
Dispute, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2013, 12:50 PM) http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324564704578631323954623876.
168. Id.
169. China Overtakes US in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007),
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geopolitical171, and economic172 reasons. All these reasons lead logically
to China’s state-owned banks giving of more than U.S. $18 billion in
low-interest loans to Chinese solar companies.173 It also explains
China’s policy to guarantee the purchase of any solar-generated
electricity for twenty years under the Golden Sun program.174 Not only
is the Golden Sun program politically beneficial by encouraging the
consumption of clean energy, it also incentives the growth of a vibrant
new industry in solar panel production and installation.
Export-driven trade policies have proven to be a highly successful
strategy for China’s economic insurgence. The solar panel industry
presents a stark example of China’s export-focused trade policy.
Ninety-five percent of all solar panels produced in China were exported
The Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing
in 2012.175
(“CASM”), a union of seven different American solar companies, claims
imports of Chinese solar panels rose more than 350 percent between
2008 and 2010.176 CASM is alarmed by the enormous influx of Chinese
imports and the accompanying 20 percent decline in American exports
of polysilicon (used in the manufacture of solar panels) and
machinery.177 In the course of two years, the United States trade
position with China has done a complete about-face. CASM states that
“[i]n 2010, the United States managed to hold on to a small solar trade
surplus with China of less than $500 million. However, in 2011, the
United States had a $1.6 billion [solar] trade deficit with China.”178
China succeeded in dominating the United States’ solar panel market in
a matter of two years as a result of an aggressive import-focused trade
policy.
Clean and stable sources of energy are critical for China’s social
stability, especially with the increasing number of protests over
environmental contamination and health problems caused by air

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html.
170. See Edward Wong, On Scale of 0 to 500, Beijing’s Air Quality Tops ‘Crazy Bad’ at 755,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/science/earth/beijing-airpollution-off-the-charts.html?_r=0.
171. Kaplan, supra note 144.
172. See Ma, supra note 46, at 2-3.
173. See Bradsher, supra note 99.
174. Id.
175. See Mathews, supra note 94.
FOR
AM.
SOLAR
MFG.,
176. See
Fact
Sheet,
COALITION
http://www.americansolarmanufacturing.org/fact-sheet/.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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pollution.179 China spent a staggering U.S. $111 billion in 2012180, and
that amount will increase by 8.7 percent in 2013181 to 769.1 billion
yuan182 (approximately U.S. $126 billion). The increased spending on
internal security “underscore the ruling Communist Party’s vigilance not
only about territorial disputes with Japan and Southeast Asia and the
U.S. “pivot” back to the region, but also about popular unrest over
corruption, pollution and abuse of power, despite robust economic
growth and rising incomes.”183 With the rise of the large and vocal
middle class increasingly focused on air pollution and public health
problems, the Chinese government sees energy scarcity as a hot-button
issue that may de-stabilize domestic security. Promoting renewables,
including solar energy, is therefore not only good environmental and
energy policy, but also good defense policy.
The solar energy industry implicates critical core interests for
China, such as sustainable energy resources, sustained economic growth,
and internal security. For these reasons, a sustained trade dispute
involving the solar industry is perhaps inevitable. Even though China
has recently reached a compromise with the European Union184 over
solar panel subsidies, “[t]he U.S.—China Solar Trade War is far from
over.”185
IV. POLICY AND NORMATIVE LESSONS
Appreciating China’s core interests through its trade policies is
important in four distinct, but related ways. First, to the extent that past
behavior is a predictor of future behavior, the core interest analysis
enables us to discern certain patterns in China’s domestic policy and
foreign policy. Among these, a greater willingness to project its power
regionally may irritate its neighbors, but will also provide a platform for
the global projection of political power.186 That has already been
happening in Africa, where China as opportunistically filled a
179. See Wong, supra note 170.
180. See China Domestic Security Spending Rises to $111 Billion, supra note 31.
181. Ben Blanchard & John Ruwitch, China Hikes Defense Budget to Spend More in Internal
Security, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2013, 3:49AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-chinaparliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Emmot & Blanchard, supra note 158.
185. Thurston, supra note 124.
186. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (presenting a
“neorealist” formulation which assumes that states are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek
their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination”).
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superpower vacuum, but is likely to occur in other areas. As China
extends its geopolitical and economic reach, it will inevitably become
enmeshed in more policy arenas, drawing it into more active roles in
international organizations and global governance structures.187
Second, in the trade arena, applying the core interest analysis helps
us predict which WTO and other trade dispute cases China will
prosecute or defend most zealously (see Part III.B’s case studies). Much
more is at stake than esoteric questions of legal compliance with the
SCM Agreement. While those issues are important, particularly in light
of China’s desire to be perceived by the international community as a
country that follows the rule of law, they are subservient to overriding
core interests like sovereignty, economic development, and social order.
Even though these interests cannot be explicitly raised in any trade
dispute, they are nonetheless highly salient. It is critical for China’s
trading partners to understand how these core interests influence the
Chinese government’s framing of legal issues that do not seem to
implicate any of these interests. Given that the WTO system maintains
the political bargaining vestige of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”) system through the consultations process,188 where
many disputes are solved through a political compromise process,
having an appreciation of the core interests may help other countries
better frame possible compromises in WTO disputes. Lawyers do not
tend to think in terms of real-politik solutions to seemingly pure legal
problems. However, such myopia is both misguided and wrong-headed.
A rich vein of law and society literature has demonstrated that legal
disputes are often guided by non-legal concerns such as reputation,189

187. Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, a central thinker in liberal legal theory, has long
asserted that one of the “most important and effective” means of global governance is not top-down
international treaty law but “direct regulation of private actors . . . with deliberate transnational or
global intent.” See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 240, 245 (2000).
188. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter
DSU], at Arts. XXII and XXIII; See also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System
of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since
1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1205-24 (1994) (providing a succinct but exhaustive
description and analysis of the functioning of the DSU).
189. See e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2002) (noting that states comply to preserve reputations and avoid
informal and formal sanctions); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law:
Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 500 (1997) [hereinafter Keohane, Two Optics] (reasoning that
institutions facilitate compliance with international law by shaping reputations).
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reciprocity,190 and perceptions of social fairness.191 These concerns are
often relevant in the case of public international disputes as well. In a
similar vein, in any negotiations it is important to grasp both your
counterpart’s articulated main concerns (including instrumental gains)192
as well as underlying interests.193
The core interest analysis also yields insights on China’s future role
in coalition and alliance-building attempts, which are especially
important for smaller developing countries. Despite being a trade
behemoth, China views itself as aligned with developing economies on a
surprising array of economic, development, market access, investment,
and other trade-related issues. Much of this is due to China’s status as a
developing nation, one that China cynically uses on many occasions as a
club.194 However, real synergies do exist between China and a diffuse
group of developing nations, whose identities shift depending on the
issue at hand. Market access for agricultural food products provides a
good example. China has joined with Argentina to attack Chile’s price
bands for agricultural products,195 Brazil and Thailand in attacking
European customs treatment of chicken,196 Thailand in protesting
European export subsidies for sugar,197 and Ecuador against U.S.
antidumping measures on shrimp.198 These examples are all related to
China’s role in the WTO dispute settlement, but many synergies are
untapped in the field of bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations as
well. Countries that wish to cooperate with China can better frame their
coalition building or negotiations strategies to appeal to China’s core
190. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 79 (1995) (states will comply with regimes they perceive to be legitimate); Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey?] (arguing that compliance arises from internalization of legal norms).
191. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, n.72 (1974).
192. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)
(analyzing compliance through rational choice theory and proposing that states comply with
international law only for instrumental reasons).
193. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 42-57 (Bruce Patton, ed., revised ed., 2011) (arguing for a principled
negotiations strategy that focuses on party’s interests rather than positions).
194. See Guzman supra note 31, at 307.
195. See Appellate Body Report, Chile — Price Band System and Safeguard Measures
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002).
196. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Customs Classification of Frozen
Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/AB/R (adopted Sept. 27, 2005).
197. See Panel Report, European Communities — Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS283/R
(adopted May 19, 2005).
198. See Panel Report, United States — Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from Ecuador,
WT/DS335/R (adopted Feb. 20, 2007).
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interests. In other words, understanding the core interests and how they
play out in WTO litigation and negotiations will help countries predict
areas in which China will likely be an ally. These observations lead to
significant implications for international global governance that are
elaborated in detail in the next subsection.
V. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS OF CORE INTERESTS
ANALYSIS
Current theories of effective global governance do not easily
accommodate core interests. It is more common to find methodologies
derived the political science199 and international relations literatures,200
which in turn uneasily grapples with complex legal regimes like the
WTO and the ever-increasingly complex web of investment and free
trade treaties that make up the global trade regime.201 Within the legal
literature on international economic law, grappling with messy realist202
or neo-realist203 interest-based analysis is eschewed in favor of analysis
based on liberal theory,204 institutionalism,205 or transnational norm
theories.206
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, a central thinker in liberal legal
theory, has long asserted that one of the “most important and effective”
199. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 41, 41 (2005).
200. See ROBERT POWELL, IN THE SHADOW OF POWER, STATES AND STRATEGIES IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, (1999) (canvassing the international relations literature and providing a
persuasive analysis of how states behave under threat).
201. See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global
Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 497 & nn.13-14, 498 & nn.15-17 (2012)
(collecting literature on multilateral treaty failures and identifying why treaties are ineffective at
coordinating global financial regulations).
202. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE (classic version, 1948).
203. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (presenting a
“neorealist” formulation which assumes that states are “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek
their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination”).
204. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 717, 718-19 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, Liberal
IR Theory] (suggesting that productive insights for international lawyers may be gained by
exploring the assumptions of international relations theory).
205. See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 8, at 7-16 (1989) (coining the term “neoliberal
institutionalism” and distinguishing this from other interest-based international relations theories);
See also, Keohane, Two Optics, supra note 189, at 490 (explaining the institutionalist account as
arising from the intuition that states sometimes “forgo the short-term advantages derived from
violating [[those] rules” in order to maintain the international system (quoting Phillip R. Trimble,
International Law, World Order and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811, 833 (1990)).
206. See, e.g., Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?, supra note 190; FRANCK, supra note 190.
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means of global governance is not top-down international treaty law but
“direct regulation of private actors . . . with deliberate transnational or
global intent.”207 In addition to transnational regulatory networks,
Slaughter also lauds the spread of “private regimes” arising from
corporate codes of conduct or industry association norms that take on
transnational effect.208 Others also champion voluntary law over
traditional, top down and state-centrist law or treaties. In an influential
piece, Professors Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal criticize the
“persistent regulatory inadequacies” of treaty-based “international ‘Old
Governance’” and encourage states and intergovernmental organizations
to focus attention on promoting voluntary networks, which might fill
governance gaps.209 Abbott and Snidal call this collection of voluntary
In this new
mechanisms “Transnational New Governance.”210
governance model, private actors such as industry groups, corporations,
and investor groups collaborate internationally, sometimes with NonGovernmental Organizations (“NGO”), states, standardization
organization, or international institutions, to generate and enforce new
norms for transnational conduct.211
Much of this scholarship emphasizes private regulation, often
voluntary, over state action. However, private regulation takes places in
the shadow of traditional laws and treaties.212 Even within the context of
Transnational New Governance, private actors and their NGO
collaborators cannot afford to ignore the core interests of their
governmental interlocutors if they hope to achieve meaningful change.
This article makes a valuable contribution to the legal, political science,
and international relations literatures by showing ways in which China’s
core interests may be easily injected into either a public or private-action

207. See Slaughter, A Liberal Theory, supra note 187, at 245.
208. Id. at 243. In Slaughter’s conception, there are two forms of “directly” regulating law,
and both are more effective at structuring private behavior and “get[ting] at the root of the problem”
than public international law, which affects private conduct only through the intermediation of the
state. Id. at 245-46. These two forms are voluntary norms with transnational effect created by
business and industry groups, and national regulations that reach across national borders to govern
extraterritorially. Id.
209. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 545 (2009) (describing and advocating a transnationally linked and voluntarily
promulgated system of regulatory norms).
210. Id. at 509.
211. Id. at 505-6.
212. Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal Law: Comment, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 249, 250
(2000) (observing that many of the nontraditional modes of global governance are “nestled within
traditional treaty regimes”).
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analysis. Core interests play a critical role not only in territorial and
political disputes (like Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea island
disputes), but also in the more esoteric realm of WTO dispute
settlement, where private actors often play a direct role, albeit behind the
scenes.213 Directly naming the core interests have great value. This
section lays out the explicative, predictive, persuasive, and coalitionbuilding values of a core interest analysis.
A. Explicative Value
The core interest analysis explains, to a large extent, China’s
intractability in many areas that have consistently caused international
controversy, such as human rights, democracy, Taiwan, and Tibet.
While it is clearly beyond the scope of this article to thoroughly discuss,
much less propose solutions, to any of these long-term controversies, it
is nonetheless worthwhile to examine briefly how the core interests
analysis bears on each of them. China usually defends its human rights
record with outright denials, obfuscations, indignation, or by relying on
national sovereignty arguments.214 However, from a core interest
perspective, the human rights dilemma (writ large) implicates not only
sovereignty, but also social stability or public order, and the dominance
of the Communist Party. Because human rights issues are so interwoven
with these important core interests, it explains why China is often so
recalcitrant over seemingly small human rights concessions, or why
policy changes tend to be only temporary, such as during the Beijing
Olympics. If human rights activists want meaningful, lasting change,
they need to directly tackle the underlying core interests and craft
solutions that address them. Tibet provides another example of how the
core interest analysis has strong explicative power.
Tibet implicates only sovereignty concerns, but also economic
development. Tibet is seen as providing critical lebensraum (or living
space) for China’s growing population. This explains why China refuses
to make public statistics on the number of ethnic Han Chinese
immigrants to Tibet.215 It also explains the massive influx of
213. See generally Gregory Shaffer et al., The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies
Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383 (2008).
214. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004) (noting that international law affects state
behavior through a process of “acculturation” in which various actors feel compelled to assimilate
through interaction with other actors).
215. See Wong supra note 37, (“Chinese officials say Tibetans make up more than 95 percent
of the region’s 2.9 million people, but refuse to give estimates on Han migrants, who are not
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infrastructural investment in Tibet in recent years, like the U.S. $3.83
billion Qinghai-Tibet Railway completed in 2006.216 The Chinese
government invested U.S. $3 billion in the Tibet Autonomous Region in
2009, a 31 percent increase from 2008.217 Tibet is seen as an economic
opportunity for China. Again, these observations are not meant to be
justificatory or apologist by any means, but a realistic assessment that
any calls for reform must tackle the underlying issues. As much as one
might like to think of Tibetan independence as a pure self-determination
and human rights issue, one cannot ignore the economic perspective.
Indeed, one of the primary benefits of the core interest analysis is that it
pinpoints the interrelated and competing interests underlying complex
issues like Tibet and human rights concerns more broadly. As such, the
core interest analysis is helpful not only for its explicative value, but also
for calling for further scholarships that apply the core interest analysis to
such issues.
B. Predictive Value
The core interest analysis also holds predictive value, particularly
in the area of trade disputes, either at the WTO or domestic level. One
would expect China to zealously defend or prosecute cases that implicate
the core interest of economic development. While all trade disputes
directly or indirectly implicate economic development in one way or
another, the prediction is strong for cases that implicate China’s policy
space to pursue its particular brand of economic development –namely,
export driven economic growth coupled with sustainable (and socially
stable) growth in domestic consumption by the middle-class.
Thus, the on-going solar dispute directly impinges on both types of
issues. As discussed in Part III.B, the solar industry has both real and
symbolic values that the core interest analysis highlights. Solar energy
is an emerging industry that is important to China’s continued economic
development. The solar industry, supported through subsidies, tax
breaks, and collaboration with state-owned enterprises is typical of the
overall structure China has created to encourage exports. Therefore, it
has symbolic value not only as a representative of China’s economic
strategy, but also as proof of China’s ability to innovate in cutting-edge
technologies.
registered residents”).
216. Xinhua News Agency, New Height of World’s Railway Born in Tibet, CHINA VIEW (Aug.
24, 2005, 4:38 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-08/24/content_3397297.htm.
217. Id.
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Lastly, solar is important for China’s social stability. China’s everincreasing demand for energy resources has caused social tensions, such
as the populist protests against land seizures for a power station in
Yunnan Province,218 as well as a host of health concerns arising from air
pollution. While solar energy can ease the demand for heavily polluting
fossil fuels, it too has come under scrutiny. In September 2011,
hundreds of residents in Zhejiang Province stormed the factory of
Zhejiang Jinko Solar Co. Ltd., a solar panel manufacturer, to protest the
emission of toxic gases and waste.219 Nonetheless, China is unlikely to
reverse its current policy of supporting the solar energy industry both as
a green alternative to fossil fuels and as a symbol of China’s model of
export-driven economic development.
C. Persuasive Value
Understanding the core interests gives China’s interlocutors access
to the persuasive power of the core interests. It gives negotiators,
activists, academics, policy-makers, and decision-makers of all types a
new set of tools to use to strategically frame issues in terms of core
interests. Not only is it important to appreciate the effect of the core
values (requiring both the explicative and predictive functions), one
must understand how to best use the core interests for advocacy or
negotiations purposes. This accords with the best practices in effective
negotiations in all contexts,220 and it applies to China across a large
range of issues.
Consider the solar energy industry disputes as an example.
Assume, as is likely, that the trade dispute results in the filing of a WTO
complaint by the United States against China, triggering automatic
consultations between the parties. If the United States hopes to achieve
a satisfactory negotiated solutions to the dispute, it needs to muster not
only all the WTO arguments, but also frame its proposed solutions in
reference to China’s core interests. One possible compromise might be
for China to agree to a voluntary phasing out of certain tax benefits or
indirect subsidies to solar panel manufacturers in return for a similar
phasing out of the United States Department of Commerce imposed
218. Major Protests and Riots in China in 2011 and 2012, FACTS AND DETAILS,
http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat8/sub49/item1894.html.
219. Elaine Kurtenbach, Over 500 Villagers Protest China Factory Pollution, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 19, 2011, 12:30 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/over-500-villagers-protestchina-factory-pollution-0.
220. See FISHER, supra note 193, at 42-57 (arguing for a principled negotiations strategy that
focuses on party’s interests rather than positions).
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countervailing duties on solar panels imported to the United States from
China. In addition, both countries could promise not to attack each
other’s policies for the guaranteed purchase of solar electricity. Such a
compromise would satisfy China’s interest in having an export market,
but also the United States’ interest in protecting its own domestic solar
panel manufactures. It would recognize that China has an interest in
encouraging the development of green energy sources for domestic
consumption, an important aspect of China’s internal social stability.
D. Coalition-Building Value
Lastly, the core interest analysis can be leveraged to provide
strategic coalition building value for developing nations within the
international trade regime. I have argued elsewhere for a number of
different ways to improve the WTO’s responsiveness to the needs of
developing nations, both within the dispute settlement context221 and
otherwise.222 Many other scholars have contributed to this large
literature.223 The lack of meaningful access the smaller developing
221. See generally Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Developing Nations:
The Need for Class Actions, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REVIEW 151, 159 (2011) (making the case for
limited class action remedy).
222. See generally Phoenix X.F. Cai, Aid for Trade: A Roadmap for Success, 36 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 283 (2008).
223. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 127 (2007);
Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of
Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 557-58 (2005); Chad P.
Bown, Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes, 27
WORLD ECON. 59 (Jan. 2004); Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN
AFF. 130 (2003); ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS? RETALIATION UNDER THE
WTO (2003); Kym Anderson, Peculiarities of retaliation in WTO dispute settlement, 1 WORLD
TRADE REV. 123 (2002); Claude Barfield, WTO Dispute Settlement System in Need of Change, 37
INTERECONOMICS 131 (2002); Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation
in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005);
Chi Charmody, Remedies and Conformity Under the WTO Agreement, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 307
(2002); Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WTO Trade Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 792 (2001); Patricio
Grané, Remedies Under WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 755 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement
and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules — Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM.
J. INT’L L 335 (2000); Robert Howse & Robert W. Staiger, United States —Anti-Dumping Act of
1916 (Original Complaint by the European Communities)—Recourse to Arbitration by the United
States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS136/ARB, 24 February 2004: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 295 (2005); JOHN H. JACKSON, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND THE
WTO: EMERGING PROBLEMS, IN FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 67 (2000); Jason E. Kearns & Steve Charnovitz, Adjudicating
Compliance in the WTO: A Review of DSU Article 21.5, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331 (2002); Pieter Jan
Kuyper, Remedies and Retaliation in the WTO: Are They Likely to Be Effective? The State
Perspective and the Company Perspective, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 282 (1997); Kofi Oteng
Kufuor, From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the Procedures
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nations face to the WTO’s dispute settlement and negotiations forums
remains one of the lingering weaknesses of the WTO system.224 Even
though the Doha round of WTO trade talks finally, after a decade-long
deadlock225 reached agreement on some issues,226 it is nonetheless
critical to find creative ways to move forward on important global trade
issues in fora other than cumbersome multilateral negotiations. While
some commentators fear the fracturing of the WTO regime due to the
rise of bilateral agreements,227 others see an opportunity to foster strong
regional alliances.228 In a climate of regionalism and bilateralism,
effective coalition-building strategies are essential.
In terms of coalition building or strategic alliances, developing
for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117 (1997); Nikolaos
Lavranos, Some Proposals for a Fundamental DSU Reform, 29 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. ECON.
INTEGRATION 73 (2002); Robert M. MacLean, The Urgent Need to Reform the WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Process, 8 INT’L TRADE L. REG. 137 (2002); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO
Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 763 (2000); Victor Mosoti, In
Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Process; A View from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B. U. INT’L L. J. 231 (2001); Joost
Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules — Toward a More
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 335 (2000); Timothy M. Reif & M. Florestal, Revenge of
the Push-Me, Pull-You: The Implementation Process under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, 32 INT’L LAW. 755 (1998); Arvind Subramanian & Jayashree Watal, Can TRIPS
Serve as an Enforcement Device for Developing Countries in the WTO?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 403
(2000); ALAN O. SYKES, The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance? NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H. JACKSON 347 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard
Quick eds., 2000); Henrik Horn, et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?
C.E.P.R. DISCUSSION PAPER 2340, (1999). In addition to the academic literature, there are a
number of proposals by states in connection with current WTO negotiations in the Doha Round.
These are helpfully listed and summarized at Marylin Johnson Raisch, Website Survey 2009, J.
INT’L ECON. LAW (Mar. 23, 2010), http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/03/23/jiel.
jgq010.full. In particular, see Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal by
the African Group, TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 25, 2002) (proposing “monetary compensation to be
continually paid pending and until the withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO obligations”
and including a number of proposals by commentators).
224. Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies in TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENTSUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 1, 26, 51-52 (ICTSD, 2003).
225. See Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, BRIDGES-WEEKLY
TRADE NEWS DIGEST (July 26, 2006), http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6354/ (“The Doha
Round of trade negotiations was put into deep freeze on 24 July, after a meeting of ministers from
six key trading nations collapsed over divisions on how to cut farm subsidies and tariffs.”); see also,
In the Twilight of Doha, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 63.
226. The Editorial Board, Trade Talks Produce a Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/opinion/trade-talks-produce-a-deal.html.
227. See Urata, supra, note 65, at 2-3.
228. For a succinct discussion of the trend of new regionalism, see generally, Trade and
OVERVIEW
VIII-X,
available
at
Development
Report,
2007,
UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007fas_en.pdf.
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nations labor at a disadvantage.229 They have fewer bargaining chips,230
wield little economic strength,231 and are handicapped by collective
action difficulties,232 as well as divergent interests.233 Despite these
difficulties, we are beginning to see encouraging trends in the WTO
arena, in the emergence of influential groups like the G20234 that have
been active at the WTO.235
However, China has yet to fulfill its promise and take on a decisive
leadership role in the international trade arena, both in terms of dispute
resolution236 and trade negotiations.237 It is difficult not to deplore the
wasted potential and lost opportunities.238 Perhaps the most intriguing
aspect of the core interest analysis is its usefulness in future coalition
building efforts. The core interest analysis may be leveraged to benefit
nations seeking alliances with China on a variety of issues. At the most
basic level, understanding the core interests and being able to identify

229. See generally Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of
Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 483 (2007).
230. See generally Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the
WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 101 (2005).
231. See e.g., Douglas Ierley, Defining the Factors that Influence Developing Country
Compliance with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the
Dispute Over Bananas, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 615, 616 (2002) (presenting the five principal
factors cited by diplomats as influencing developing country participation in and compliance with
WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions, including lack of economic power).
232. Jayashree Watal, Developing Countries’ Interests in a “Development Round,” in THE
WTO AFTER SEATTLE 71 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000) (explaining that for many decades, developing
nations were not significant players in the rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under GATT);
see generally Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291,
317 (2006) (noting that due to globalization and the increasing interdependence of states, many
modern problems cannot be solved in a purely consensual system and require formal international
agreement, “rules that require strict compliance,” and mechanisms to influence the conduct of
outlier states).
233. Victor Mosoti, In Our Own Image, Not Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial
Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process; A View from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B.U.
INT’L L. J. 231, 232 (2001).
234. See Sungjoon Cho, Doha’s Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 170-72 (2007)
(describing the strong role played by the G-20 on agricultural negotiations at the Cancun Ministerial
Conference).
235. See Pedro da Motta Veiga, Brazil and the G20 Group of Developing Countries,
THE
CHALLENGES
OF
WTO
PARTICIPATION:
CASE
STUDY
7,
MANAGING
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case7_e.htm#first.
236. See Phoenix X.F. Cai, Making WTO Remedies Work for Developing Nations: The Need
for Class Actions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONVENTION AND JUSTICE (David A. Frenkel ed.,
2011).
237. See Guzman, supra note 31, at 307.
238. See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Doha Round Negotiation: Suspended Indefinitely,
ASIL INSIGHTS (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/10/issue/22/wto-doha-roundnegotiation-suspended-indefinitely.
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which ones are implicated in any given issue is in and of itself helpful.
The explicative power of the core interests can shed light on China’s
motivations, especially when they are mixed. Beyond the explicative
value, understanding the core interests enables potential partners to
frame issues in more attractive ways to appeal to, down-play, or avoid
China’s interests, as appropriate to the situation. By identifying the core
interests, discussing how they are implicated in recent and long-standing
controversies, and highlighting the role they play in trade disputes, this
article lays the foundations for robust debate and future scholarship on
the utility of the core interest analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
China will continue to be a dominant force in the global economy
for the near future. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the interests
that drive China’s trade and foreign policies. This article articulates
three core interests that will dominate China’s decision-making for at
least the next decade.
Appreciating the explicative, predictive,
persuasive, and coalition-building values of the core interests will be
indispensable in understanding China.
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